While the Administration and NSA argue that the export restrictions
keep strong encryption programs out of terrorists' reach, in fact, terrorists
and criminals can choose from more than 500 encryption programs in over
65 countries to download off the Internet. It is estimated that over 90
percent of the cryptographic white papers originate outside the United States,
reflecting the vast amount of foreign academic research and development,
which result in a diverse offering of encryption products.
"They are not stopping it [encryption], they are just changing who
is driving it," said Bruce Schneier, president of Counterpane Systems,
a consulting firm specializing in cryptography and computer security.
Whitfield Diffie, an engineer at Sun Microsystems, says weak encryption
is in line with the main directive of the NSA: to monitor communications
to uncover national security violations. An intelligence officer whose primary
job is to read encrypted communications cannot afford to dedicate vast amounts
of time and resources to cracking strong encryption keys.
Ken Bass, partner at Venable, Baetjer, Howard and Civiletti, LLP, agrees
that current export controls were born from NSA's desire to inhibit strong
encryption because they had to crack them. By restricting the deployment
of strong encryption software, NSA has "induced an arms control race
with cryptographers." Bass argues that if the NSA had not closed cryptographic
programs to users, people would have been satisfied with simpler encryption.
But by calling attention to encryption, it has given hackers a motive for
cracking U.S.-endorsed encryption programs, and thus, the NSA "shot
itself in the foot" by inadvertently driving the production of stronger
encryption programs.
The FBI's advocacy of key escrow is also said to be grounded in its latest
efforts to push for wire tapping funds. Under the current Administration,
law enforcement has reportedly set records for the number of wire taps performed.
Yet, the FBI and government key escrow advocates fail to explain why they
need to monitor people electronically to enforce laws. Under existing laws,
law enforcement agencies (including the FBI) cannot use electronic surveillance
to uncover crimes; they must first present a "just cause" for
surveillance. The surveillance is used for gathering solid evidence for
criminal conviction.
Barry Steinhardt, spokesman for the American Civil Liberties Union says
wire tapping is an unnecessary activity given its track record. According
Steinhardt, wire tapping during this decade has resulted in a17 percent
success rate of finding convictable evidence compared to a 50 percent rate
in the 1970s. He says the U.S. Administration (and citizens) would not tolerate
such inefficiencies in other government programs; the programs would be
terminated.
Privacy advocates calling for reformed encryption policies acknowledge the
national security concerns, but say the current policies have proven themselves
ineffectual and detrimental to our economy and culture, and should therefor
be reformed through public forum discussions.
Supporting these claims, U.S. representative Anna Eschew (D-CA) says, "we
need to loosen export policies, while addressing national security concerns
of the administration."